Shahed-136 reference card · ARC Warning Reference card
Shahed-136 Iranian-designed one-way attack drone. Russia designates the Shahed-136 as Geran-2. This card repeats published descriptions only.
These cards are encyclopedic. They are not targeting, manufacturing, or acquisition guidance. A field says unknown/disputed when the cited open source does not state it. ARC Warning is not an emergency service.
Catalog revised 2026-10-11 . Also known as Geran-2, Geranium-2.
Published description Names, aliases, and NATO designation Shahed-136. Russian designation Geran-2. No NATO reporting name is given on the CSIS page. Confidence: high. The cited page states this. CSIS states the Geran-2 designation directly. A NATO name is not supplied there, so none is added. CSIS Missile Threat: Shahed-131 and -136 Type and role One-way attack uncrewed aircraft. Confidence: high. The cited page states this. CSIS characterizes the Shahed-131 and Shahed-136 as one-way attack UAVs. CSIS Missile Threat: Shahed-131 and -136 Manufacturer and country Iranian design. CSIS reports later production in Russia under the Geran-2 name. The producing company’s name is not taken from CSIS. Confidence: medium. The cited page supports this, with a stated limit. Origin and the Geran-2 label are from CSIS. A corporate name is left off rather than copied from a secondary page. CSIS Missile Threat: Shahed-131 and -136 Operators Iran and Russia, as described by CSIS. Confidence: high. The cited page states this. CSIS describes Iranian displays of the type and Russian employment of Shahed-136 drones from 2022. CSIS Missile Threat: Shahed-131 and -136 Launch platform CSIS describes a truck-mounted container that uses a short-burn rocket to get the aircraft airborne, plus portable launchers. Confidence: high. The cited page states this. This is the published launch description. It is not a procedure. CSIS Missile Threat: Shahed-131 and -136 Guidance CSIS describes onboard navigation and a satellite-navigation antenna. Confidence: medium. The cited page supports this, with a stated limit. Variant-by-variant avionics are not settled in the CSIS summary, so the card stays at that description. CSIS Missile Threat: Shahed-131 and -136 Propulsion Rotary engine. Confidence: high. The cited page states this. CSIS says both the Shahed-131 and Shahed-136 rely on rotary engines. Later variants are not cataloged here. CSIS Missile Threat: Shahed-131 and -136 Published speed About 180 km/h. Confidence: medium. The cited page supports this, with a stated limit. CSIS says the Shahed-131 and Shahed-136 are reported at about 180 km/h, and that dimensions vary as the design changes. CSIS Missile Threat: Shahed-131 and -136 Range Published estimates differ: about 1,000–2,000 km in some estimates, and 2,500 km in a Defense Intelligence Agency figure relayed by CSIS. Confidence: disputed. Open sources disagree, or the figure is a relayed claim. CSIS presents those figures as estimates, not a single official range. CSIS Missile Threat: Shahed-131 and -136 Warhead type and weight CSIS gives a payload of about 20–50 kg. It does not publish one warhead model. Confidence: medium. The cited page supports this, with a stated limit. Payload mass is not the same thing as a complete warhead roster. No further types are added. CSIS Missile Threat: Shahed-131 and -136 Blast and fragmentation radius unknown/disputed Confidence: unknown. The cited page does not state this, so the card does not guess. The sources cited here give a warhead class or mass where they give one. They do not state a blast or fragmentation radius, and none is inferred. CSIS Missile Threat: Shahed-131 and -136 Interceptability and countermeasures unknown/disputed Confidence: unknown. The cited page does not state this, so the card does not guess. CSIS describes use of the aircraft. It does not publish an intercept method, and this card does not supply one. CSIS Missile Threat: Shahed-131 and -136 Reported unit cost unknown/disputed Confidence: unknown. The cited page does not state this, so the card does not guess. CSIS does not publish a unit price on the page used here. Differing press estimates are not repeated. CSIS Missile Threat: Shahed-131 and -136 Service history CSIS reports that Russia began receiving Iranian Shahed aircraft in 2022 and employing the Shahed-136 that year, with the Geran-2 designation used in Russia. Confidence: high. The cited page states this. The card stops at that published history. CSIS Missile Threat: Shahed-131 and -136 Media No official or public-domain embed is attached. Combat footage is not embedded on this card.
Seen in ARC Warning No approved ARC Warning record currently names this system.
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